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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the connection between social constructionism and universals in 
the generation of mind. It proposes a new concept of Cultural Construction, distinct 
from social construction, and suggests that the latter succumbs to a Paradox of Sociality 
in which a socially constructed mind is non-social. Cultural construction avoids this 
paradox, and is best explained by an approach that roots learning in flexible 
evolutionary dispositions to possess culture. It also offers a novel perspective on 
traditional and more recent social constructionist accounts of psychological universals 
(e.g., omniculture) and has different implications for the prospects of reducing conflict 
in inter-cultural encounters. 
 
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, 
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. 
 
 
  
Social Construction, Evolution and Cultural Universals 3 
 
Social Construction, Evolution and Cultural Universals 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The connections between culture and mind are central considerations for psychology, 
and a recent important turn has been to consider not only cross-cultural variations and 
cross-cultural universals separately, but together. It is, arguably, not possible to consider 
cross-cultural variation in mind without framing this against a context of what does not 
vary across cultures, and vice versa (see, e.g., Brown, 2000; Henrich, Heine & 
Norenzayan, 2010; Jahoda, 2012; Kappeler & Silk, 2010; Moghaddam, 2012; nor, 
indeed, what does and does not vary across humans and non-human primates: e.g., 
Uher, 2008). This paper seeks to further such parallel consideration, and to suggest 
some theoretical and practical consequences.  
 
After making some preliminary clarifications of concepts, I sketch two different 
questions regarding the construction of mind. One concerns the traditional focus of 
social construction on how exposure to or engagement in specific qualities of social life  
leads to specific qualities of mind (such as particular beliefs, or tendencies to process 
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information in culturally-specific ways).  The second concerns a less widely-discussed 
issue of ‘cultural construction’, regarding how exposure to and engagement with 
universal qualities of culture might construct pan-cultural qualities of mind (such as the 
capacity for culture, sharing intentions and action, norms and beliefs). I then suggest 
that focussing on the first question alone can generate a “paradox of sociality” for social 
construction – a mind that is fully socially constructed may turn out to be not social at 
all: it may lack sociality. That is, social construction, as widely understood, may lead to 
mental states and processes that do not intrinsically relate to, or depend on the mental 
states of other people. A solution to this paradox, I suggest, lies in locating answers to 
the question of social construction in the context of answers to the question of cultural 
construction of mind. I then consider some ways in which the relevant pan-cultural 
qualities have been understood.  
 
One such understanding and its policy implications have recently been debated in 
Culture & Psychology – omniculture (see Moghaddam, 2012). Moghaddam makes the 
important suggestion that cross-cultural encounters, especially those historically 
connected to conflict, should begin with an emphasis on specific beliefs and values that 
can be directly tapped into in thought and behaviour and have been empirically 
demonstrated to be common to all cultures (omniculture), before contemplating 
differences between them. This, he argues, provides means for resolving entrenched 
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conflict. Whilst lauding this intent, others suggest that the empirical characterisation of 
omniculture faces significant challenges (Bilewicz & Bilewicz, 2012; Gillespie, 
Howarth & Cornish, 2012).  
 
I  argue  that omniculture also succumbs to social constructionism’s paradox of 
sociality. However, other ways of understanding pan-cultural qualities offer suggestions 
for resolving the paradox. These involve evolutionary explanations of the 
interdependent roles of the culturally specific and the culturally universal. The 
discussion thereby situates the debate concerning omniculture in a broader context of 
possibilities. Such evolutionarily-inspired explanations are not only compatible with, 
but depend on, an account of cultural learning that is compatible with cultural 
psychology. This leads to a focus on both the content of universals (i.e., what the 
universals are about or what they concern, for example whether they relate to specific 
beliefs or more general qualities) and their psychological nature (i.e., their origin, in 
terms of their relative dependence on innate and/or cultural influences; and their role in 
thought, in terms of whether they can be directly tapped into in thought and behaviour 
or are inferred as underlying them).  These considerations have  implications for policy 
regarding inter-cultural contact and conflict resolution.  
2 Preliminaries 
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Before developing the argument, it will help to offer some preliminary characterisations 
of concepts, which will be developed in more detail below. The key terms in the 
discussion will be  ‘mind’, ‘sociality’, ‘social construction’ and ‘cultural construction’. 
‘Mind’ here is taken here in a more or less pretheoretic sense to involve the set of 
processes and capacities that are engaged in processing information and supporting 
action.  It covers affective, emotional and motivational states, perceptions of others and 
the self. Put another way, the intention is that the discussion does not depend on the 
details of any particular model of mind.  
 
One of the central ideas discussed concerns the possible ‘sociality’ of mind. ‘Sociality’ 
is also here taken in a more or less preteoretic sense to  concern the knowledge and 
skills involved in interacting with other people qua social beings – including the 
intersection of qualities often ascribed to theory of mind and to theory of society/folk 
sociology. That is, the capacity to interact with people on the basis of presumptions, 
inferences and practices about their reasons, beliefs and other mental states, where the 
latter also connect with joint intentionality, relational inferences, group memberships, 
stereotypes and so on. This can be seen as a generalisation of Greenwood’s (2004: p.20) 
suggestion that a mental state is constitutively social if it necessarily involves the 
representations of other people: ‘a belief or attitude that is held by an individual (or 
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individuals) socially: that is, because and on condition that other members of a social 
group are represented as holding that belief or attitude’.  It depends constitutively on the 
representation of others’ representations. The same attitude could be held non-socially, 
if it was believed without regard to what other people believe. The sense of  sociality 
employed here includes this, but is broadened to include any non-representational states 
in which we obtain information by detecting  and responding to (information about) 
other people, without explicitly representing them or their representations (such as what 
have been called social or cultural affordances: e.g., Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, 
Karasawa & Uskul, 2009; Franks, 2011). Individual mind exhibits sociality - is 
intrinsically social -  when its psychological processes (on the pre-theoretic approach 
assumed), representations and resultant actions engage with others in this way. The 
outcome is the implicit or explicit detection, recognition or representation of others (and 
their mental states and experiences), and the appropriate adjustment and calibration of 
action. Sociality, on this view, is a matter of having a broadly psychological orientation 
or directeness towards others (and their psychology), which supports action and 
interaction on those bases. 
 
The issue to be addressed, then, concerns the connection between the possible sociality 
of mind and forms of construction – social and cultural construction. Social construction 
is the well-established perspective that argues that all specific contents of mind (beliefs, 
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attitudes, self-perceptions, reasoning processes, etc.) are wholly contingent on specific 
aspects of social life and interaction that occur in a particular time and place. That is, 
social construction principally addresses the first question noted below, of how different 
specific social and cultural circumstances give rise to different specific ways of thinking 
and behaving.  Cultural construction, by contrast, will be understood as the possibility 
that more generic contents of mind (ways of thinking, templates for thought, heuristics 
for learning about the self and others, etc., that hold across locations and times) are 
partially contingent on qualities of social and cultural settings that are not tied to a 
specific time or location, and partially contingent on biological underpinnings. It 
therefore addresses the second question noted below, of how the fact of being cultural 
or of having cultural capacities, gives rise to pan-cultural qualities of mind. 
 
We can now briefly prefigure the argument. The first part of the over-all argument will 
be that social construction’s commitment to contingency and specificity means that all 
qualities of mind – including sociality – are contingent. This generates the possible 
outcome that mental capacities may simply lack sociality. This is what I refer to as 
social construction’s paradox of sociality. The second part of the argument will be that 
cultural construction circumvents this paradox by making sociality in general an 
intrinsic part of mind (as a result of its evolutionary grounding), even if the expression 
and acquisition of specific forms of  sociality depend on specific locations. 
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3 Social and Cultural Construction: Two Questions About Making Minds 
Social construction is a fundamental theoretical tenet in social and cultural psychology, 
whose qualities have been widely, though too often, polemically, debated (Boghossian, 
2006; Burr, 1995;  Gergen, 2009; Franks, 2011, 2013ab, Mallon, 2008). Recent views 
have, however, argued for reconciling social construction with evolutionarily inspired 
approaches, without compromising insights from both (Franks, 2011, 2013ab; Mallon & 
Stich, 2000). This paper is in that spirit. 
 
3.1. Question 1: Mind and the Cross-Cultural 
Social constructionism is a broad church, but at its heart is a set of answers to Question 
1: (how) do different specific societies and cultures create the specific qualities of mind 
and behaviour in those particular settings? Recurrent answers contend that many 
psychological capacities depend for their form on local contingencies of society and 
history (e.g., Burr, 1995; Gergen, 1973; 2009). Without those social and historical 
circumstances, particular mental phenomena could not have arisen, and under different 
circumstances different mental phenomena would have arisen.  
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‘Specificity’ here, concerns both the originating social circumstances and the resulting 
aspects of mind.  The social circumstances relate to, for example, interaction rituals, 
social practices, institutions, and so on, whose particular qualities generate the specific 
contents of thought, ways of thinking about and with them, and relevant normative and 
value-related stances. They arise from and remain applicable to or appropriate ways of 
responding to, specific contexts. This connection between social practices and and 
beliefs, is confirmed by commitment to the inseparability of process and content: social 
processes are intertwined with representations that have socially-derived content.  
Specificity thus suggests that a socially constructed way of thinking has direct 
application to a context because of the meshing of its details with that context; the less 
similarity between the original context and any new contexts that are encountered, the 
less applicable is the way of thinking. This suggests that moving to a different context 
where there were massive differences in specific beliefs and ways of behaving might 
generate a catastrophic ‘culture shock’, because there is (by assumption) no foundation 
for commonality other than those beliefs and ways of behaving. Social construction, 
then, expresses the important role of specific and contingent social influences that result 
in specific qualities of mind with specific contents. 
 
‘Contingency’ here can be highlighted by contrast with what Boghossian (2006) calls 
‘mandated construction’, where mental capacities would be constructed according to 
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factors that are not wholly contingent on present or recent historical and social 
circumstances. A mandated construction seems the hallmark of some evolutionary 
approaches to mind, where evolved adaptations provide the driving force for mental 
capacities (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Such views argue that adaptations are 
expressed as (one or more) mental modules, special-purpose devices that apply to their 
own domains from which they process information according to dedicated procedures. 
Although the details of the resulting capacities are culture-dependent, the fact that 
people possess those capacities, with their generic qualities, is mandated by the 
adaptation (e.g., Sperber, 2004; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). Hence, evolutionary 
psychology proposes that mental capacities are partly contingent not on short-term 
historical and cultural variations, but on very long-term evolutionary-historical 
contingencies. 
 
By contrast, ‘contingency’ for social construction connotes the idea that at different 
points in history, different social pressures arise and give rise to different ways of 
thinking. As Hacking (1999) puts it, social construction of a social fact suggests that it  
“was brought into existence or shaped by social events, forces, history, all of which 
could well have been different” (Hacking 1999: p.7). The impact of such a notion in 
relation to social psychology  is perhaps  best expressed by Gergen’s classic argument 
regarding ‘social psychology as history’ (1973: p. 310): “it deals with facts that are 
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largely nonrepeatable and which fluctuate markedly over time. Principles of human 
interaction cannot readily be developed over time because the facts on which they are 
based do not generally remain stable.” And if the social facts and the forms of social 
interaction are contingent and nonrepeatable, the mental facts that depend on them are 
also nonrepeatable.  
 
The specificity of social construction is highlighted by contrast with a further element of 
evolutionary psychology: what Sperber (1996) calls a ‘meta-template’. A meta-template 
is understood as a representation of generic information about a domain of knowledge 
or action, whose content is innately predisposed as part of an adaptation regarding that 
domain. Such generic content is universal, whilst the specific attributes that instantiate, 
demarcate, add to or otherwise specify or refine it arise from culture (see also Bergesen, 
2012; Peterson, 2012). For example, the meta-template for an hypothesised capacity for 
commonsense understanding of biological or social ‘kinds’ might indicate that a 
category has presumed essential properties – an essence ‘place holder’ which does not 
specify what the essence is, but does indicate that it is responsible for category 
membership, connects to reproduction, to surface appearance and behavioural 
properties. The particular properties represented as essences (that ‘fill’ the place holder), 
and which categories are essentialised, depends on culture. The resulting capacity 
therefore combines generic, mandated construction from the adaptation with the 
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specific, social construction from the cultural input. Hence, evolutionary psychology 
proposes mandated constructions of generic content plus contingent constructions of 
specific content. 
The contrast with social construction is evident: not only does traditional social 
construction emphasise the contingency and specificity of social influences that result in 
specific qualities of mind, it also proposes that those influences are social influences. 
There is no obvious role for any features – including specific or contingent features - 
that may be biological in origin (e.g., Gergen, 2003); Diaz Leon, 2013). We take this up 
later on. 
 
3.2. Question 2: Mind and the Cultural 
 
We now turn to Question 2: (how) do society and culture in general, per se create 
general qualities of mind and behaviour in any setting? This is the question of ‘cultural 
construction’ – whether the fact of being cultural, or having the capacity to have socio-
cultural experience, contributes to our mental capacities.  
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In contrast to social construction, this concerns not specific qualities of social life 
contributing to specific details of attitudes, beliefs and so on, but instead relatively 
generic or widely-applicable qualities of cultural life contributing to generic qualities of 
(social) mental life – such as the fact of sharing intentions and beliefs, or of entering 
into and sharing joint arrangements for action based on shared beliefs and norms. These 
results are portable qualities of mind and belief – they do not depend on specific aspects 
of the context for their application or their generation. Whilst they may enable, support 
or give rise to specific ways of thinking in specific contexts, their own application is not 
tied to those contexts. And whilst they may be manifest as part of specific, detailed 
ways of thinking in everyday life, their importance to cultural construction lies in their 
generic qualities. The contrast with the implications of social constructionism’s 
specificity is clear. It would mean that moving to contexts where people possessed 
radically different specific beliefs and ways of interacting would be a challenge, but not 
catastrophic – precisely because of sharing the common underpinning of being cultural 
in this way. Moreover, cultural construction concerns not the highly contingent detailed 
qualities of cultural items, but rather the relatively non-contingent qualities of 
(possessing) culture (or more accurately, those which are only contingent on longer-
term, perhaps evolutionary-historical processes). The possibility being canvassed here is 
that it is their cultural nature per se that allows such features to contribute to non-
specific, generic qualities of mental life; and the resulting qualities of mind are 
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applicable across multiple contexts beyond the contingencies of acquisition. We canvass 
some proposals for this below, noting that they require an integral role for evolution.  
 
Before this, however, note something of the relations between Question 1 and Question 
2. Answering ‘Yes’ to Question 1 does not entail  ‘Yes’ to Question 2: social 
construction does not entail cultural construction – if specific aspects of mind vary 
cross-culturally, this does not entail that core qualities of mind in general are created by 
culture. For example, as noted above  for evolutionary psychology, the role of culture is 
to ‘fill in the details’ of a capacity whose foundations are constituted by a non-cultural 
(biological) capacity, with different results in different settings.  Reciprocally, 
answering ‘Yes’ to Question 2 does not entail ‘Yes’ to Question 1: cultural construction 
does not entail social construction – if generic qualities of mind are created by culture, 
this does not entail cross-cultural variation in specific aspects of mind. The qualities of 
culture that constitute mind may be common across all cultures, and could generate a 
common outcome. So answers to the two questions may be, to a degree, independent. 
 
4 Social Construction’s Sociality Paradox 
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We now turn to how these forms of construction connect to the sociality of mind. It may 
seem strange to even raise this issue – surely, social and/or cultural construction would 
by definition guarantee that the mind is intrinsically social? I think there are reasons to 
at least cast doubt on this, because of what can be called Social Construction’s Sociality 
Paradox: social construction, as widely formulated, need not generate mental capacities 
that are intrinsically social in the broad sense noted above (see also Greenwood, 2004: 
p. 242, for an argument that traditional social construction leads to an impoverished 
conception of the social and its relation to mind). 
 
4.1 Social Construction’s Sociality Paradox and its Origins 
This arises from the three conditions of social construction – its contingency, specificity 
and the fact that neither contingency nor specificity are understood to  have any 
significant constraint or direction from biology. First, note that the force that constructs 
a capacity – its origin – is no indicator of the content or focus of the outcome capacity. 
The nature of a cause does not determine the nature of a consequence. If a mental 
capacity is primarily constructed by social or cultural forces (e.g. if it arises as a 
consequence of interaction or of the flow of cultural information), this does not mean 
that it concerns, involves in its process, is about or directly represents that or any other 
social or cultural force. A socially constructed capacity could be about biological or 
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natural phenomena, and a naturalistically constructed capacity could be about social or 
cultural phenomena. Put another way, the fact that a belief arises or a way of thinking 
takes place in the presence of other people, does not vouchsafe its sociality: on the 
broad definition noted above, such a belief or way of thinking may still lack the intrinsic 
reference to or dependence on the beliefs or other mental states of those other people.  
Whilst a straightforward point, this implies that we cannot look for a guarantee of the 
social nature of the operation of mind – its sociality - in the social origin of mind. This 
general point is reinforced in particular by social constructionism’s commitment to the 
local contingency of construction. A capacity that is socially constructed and has social 
content or process in one context or at one time, may not have that content or process in 
another. More generally, socially constructed social capacities present in one context 
may not be present in another: there is no guarantee of pan-cultural sociality.  
 
Lest this seem rather abstract, consider Rosaldo’s (1982) analysis of speech acts. 
Speech act theory concerns people performing social actions by using forms of language 
with conventional force – for example, making promises or requests (Austin, 1976).  
The social conventions often require the speaker and hearer to be in appropriate mental 
states for the acts to be properly executed. Rosaldo (1982) reports ethnographic work 
with the Ilongots tribe of the Phillipines, suggesting they have no speech act 
corresponding to promising. Their culture, she suggests, de-emphasises individual 
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intentions and sincerity, and emphasises social roles and public undertakings, which are 
not characterised by relatively informal promises, but instead by formal, public oaths 
and proclamations. She therefore claims that speech act theory does not provide a 
universal account of the types of speech acts used by cultures, since it places too great 
an “emphasis on the speaker’s psychological state” (Rosaldo, 1982: p. 227). Regarding 
our discussion, the culture is taken to direct the psychological states that are available to 
its members, and therefore those which can be communicated through speech acts.   
 
What matters here is not that a specific socio-historical location might possess a unique 
way of thinking that adds to those possessed by all other locations. Rather, what matters 
is that it may not possess one or more ways of thinking that other locations do possess. 
The generalisation is that it may possess none of them. The paradox is thus that the 
social creates the non-social. 
 
Social constructionism might respond to this paradox in various ways. Before we look 
at some possible responses, it might be worthwhile to tease out two different variants of 
this paradox – a weak and a strong variant.  
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4.2 Weak and Strong Variants of Social Construction’s Sociality Paradox 
A weak sociality paradox would suggest that locally socially constructed sociality 
would not be global sociality. This weak variant would be  broadly epistemological in 
its force:  people from some locations in time and space may well have differently 
constituted forms of sociality (for all we can tell) but they would not  be recognised as 
sociality by people from other locations, who would therefore be unable to interact 
successfully with them.  It may possess a form of sociality, but not terms that could be 
understood or recognised by those from other locations or times.  This is, in a way, a 
generalisation of the empirical evidence of the experience of strong cultural differences 
in interaction, of ‘culture shock’, to go beyond differences in specific values, attitudes 
or practices, and to encompass differences in sociality in toto. The paradox arises 
because there are no specific and/or contingent social means to prevent this 
generalisation. The strong sociality paradox might be glossed as ontological: people 
from some locations in time and space may simply not have sociality of any kind. This 
strong variant then suggests that a locally socially constructed mentality would not 
comprise sociality at all. Our main focus will be on the weak variant. 
 
As suggested, this paradox arises from the traditional framing of social construction: if 
the specific qualities of core mental capacities are contingent  on historically and 
Social Construction, Evolution and Cultural Universals 20 
 
culturally local social experiences and neither specificity nor contingency involve 
evolutionary direction or constraint, then the paradox arises. However, if social 
construction were able to embrace non-contingency, or the construction of non-specific 
(generic) mental capacities, then arguably it could avoid the sociality paradox. 
Embracing non-contingency would allow the possibility of mandated constructions 
towards sociality; and embracing the construction of generic capacities would allow that 
the variation in detailed psychological competences could be underwritten by a generic 
sociality. Both of these possibilities are available to social psychology that integrates 
evolutionary and cultural pressures in the construction of mind in a search for ways of 
balancing the pan-cultural with the culturally-specific(see e.g., Keller, 2002, and 
Vygotsky for general developmental perspectives; and Uher, 2013 for a discussion that 
also takes in important issues concerned with personality measurement and 
conceptualisation). So it may be that cultural construction can tread where social 
construction cannot, since the usual formulation of social construction leads to 
problematic outcomes; we return to this below. 
 
To sum up, the sociality paradox is can be seen as a derivation or generalisation of the 
relativism or near-relativism to which social construction is a standing invitation: if 
socially constructed mental capacities can vary more or less arbitrarily with cultural 
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setting, then they may vary so as to preclude sociality in general or sociality that would 
be recognised by those from other locations in particular.  
 
4.3 Responses to the Sociality Paradox: Causal and Constitutive Social Construction 
Social constructionism could, of course, offer a comeback to this allegation of a 
sociality paradox. This might say that the way the paradox is framed presupposes the 
very thing which social construction would deny – the separability of the social and the 
mind. To see this, we need to differentiate between two variants of social construction  
(see also Diaz-Leon, 2013; Franks, 2013a; Mallon, 2008), which share the commitment 
to specificity and contingency but offer different general views of the relation between 
social context and – causal social construction (in which the social context is extrinsic 
to mental processes and causes variations in how they operate), and constitutive social 
construction (in which the social context is not separate but is an intrinsic part of mental 
processes). Social constructionism has often argued that many views treat the social as 
somehow superficial or extrinsic to the essential functioning of the mind. For example, 
by taking culture as a context that elicits or activates relevant knowledge (as in views 
arising from social cognition: Jahoda, 2012), the social is taken to function as an 
independent variable, separate and separable from mind. The mind would not be 
intrinsically social, since the social is an extraneous context or influence, which mental 
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processes could (at least in principle) function without. This kind of variation in specific 
qualities of mind arising from the causal impact of a separate social influence expresses 
causal social construction (see Diaz Leon, 2013; Mallon, 2008, Franks, 2011; Hacking, 
1999; Searle, 1996). As Diaz Leon (2013: p. 5) puts it, something “is causally socially 
constructed when social factors or social agents are causally responsible for the 
existence of the object or the instantiation of the corresponding properties.” The 
operation of the qualities of mind that are produced in this way would be separable from 
the social conditions that produce them: remove those conditions and, once the qualities 
of mind are produced, they could still (in principle) continue to operate. 
 
The alternative, constitutive social constructionist view is the ‘stronger’ version of 
social construction – that the social and historical location is somehow constitutive of 
the psychological capacity. There is no simple way of separating out the capacity and 
the context that constructs it, because that context itself provides the process of social 
construction, which just is (part of) the process of social interaction, and part of the 
process of thought.  Again, Diaz- Leon (2013: pp. 5-6):  something “is constitutively 
socially constructed  when it is part of the definition of what it is for someone to be an 
F, or part of the nature of being an F (i.e. what makes someone an F), that Fs stand in 
some relation to social agents or social factors”.  To use a socially constructed quality of 
mind, on this view, is to be directly connected to the social factors that constitute or 
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define it. Remove those factors and the quality itself (in principle) can no longer be 
operational. Using a socially constructed capacity is, on such a view, by definition 
‘dialogical’, in that it necessarily involves other people as sources of content and of 
interlocking, mediating and interpretive or semiotic processes (e.g., Markova, 2002; 
Jovchelovitch, 2006; Markus & Hamedani, 2007; Valsiner, 2001). Process and content 
are thus inseparable. 
 
Treating the social as such a constitutive aspect of thought is a prima facie plausible way 
of sidestepping the paradox, but it has costs.  The main cost is of denying the contingency 
and presumably also specificity that are hallmarks of social constructionism. This is 
because the processes of constitutive social construction always entail the sociality of 
mind, because social construction is mandated to involve sociality in cause and 
consequence, via the integral role of social interaction and allied processes. This response 
does not appeal to socially constructed specific qualities in specific settings – its solution 
to the sociality paradox is not to list all specific forms of social interaction and show 
empirically how they connect to thought; rather, it is to make the in principle argument 
that all significant thinking intrinsically involves sociality. Of course, this claim might be 
softened to become one that the sociality of thought is contingent and only appears to be 
mandated, because it happens to apply to all significant forms of thinking in all cultures. 
But this seems like empirical camouflage for an in principle assumption. The generic 
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quality of thought which is constitutively based on social interaction thus ensures an 
effective mandate of pan-cultural sociality of (important aspects of) thought.  
 
This solution to the paradox also seems to elide the distinction between social and cultural 
construction – the sociality of thought is ensured by mandated construction of generic 
aspects of thought, rather than contingent construction of specific aspects. Without the 
mandate –without demurring from contingency – sociality is not guaranteed. And this 
solution also seems to bring back the separation between generic processes of sociality or 
dialogicality, on the one hand, and specific contents and situations to which they apply on 
the other. In sum, this solution seems ill at ease with some fundamental aspects of social 
construction.  
 
Social construction may thus be on the horns of a dilemma: either retain full contingency, 
and accept that sociality is not intrinsic (and so allow the Sociality Paradox to arise), or 
argue that sociality is intrinsic but deny contingency (and so undermine the Sociality 
Paradox but deny a central aspect of social construction). 
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5 Cultural Construction: the Pan-Cultural in Mind 
 
If we take the non-contingency horn of social construction’s sociality dilemma, then a 
further question arises: where does a pan-cultural mandate to sociality originate? What 
constructs cultural construction?  
 
5.1 Social Construction and the Pan-Cultural 
Taking the social constructionist response to the paradox, why might social interaction or 
dialogicality be fundamental to thought? A traditional social constructionist answer might 
be that, since past culture generates current culture, the mandate to current sociality is a 
cultural mandate (see, e.g., Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, Uskul (2009) for an 
account of cultural mandates that has this flavour). This displaces the explanation to more 
distant history and past cultures, and presumably requires some point at which the 
contingent transmuted (perhaps by degrees) into the non-contingent. There is no doubt 
that particular cultures or cultural patterns are dependent on their past for qualities that 
seem mandatory in those cultures in the present; but generalising this to a cultural 
explanation for generic qualities that are mandated for all cultures –  where culture per se 
alone would explain cultural mandates per se – is a large step. 
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5.2 Omniculture and the Pan-Cultural 
 
Such a  view contrasts with Mogghadam’s concept of omniculture, as becomes clear 
when we see that omniculture concerns specific qualities of culture which happen to be 
shared (see Moghaddam, 2012: p. 318). Mogghadam is concerned not with generic 
qualities of being social or cultural, but with commonalities of specific cultural norms, 
values and practices. Omniculture arises, presumably, as a consequence of inter-cultural 
contact and transmission, or of facing common historical, social and ecological 
challenges which generate requisite patterns of interaction; that is, traditional social 
construction emerging from shared contingencies. As a policy practice, omniculture 
places a premium on universals or commonalities that can be observed or recognised by 
people in their everyday interaction with people from different social and cultural 
origins – they are ‘surface’ or ‘emic’ universals. Indeed, Moghaddam (2012: p. 318) 
calls this the ‘omnicultural imperative’: ”During interactions with others, under all 
conditions, first give priority to the characteristics you share with other people as 
members of the human group.”  The central role in omniculture for the everyday 
recognition of shared sociality raises the possibility that it is subject to the weak 
sociality paradox. 
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It certainly seems evident that the sociality paradox is not resolved by an appeal to 
omniculture. This is because omniculture itself seems to arise from the aggregation over 
particular social constructions – the piecing together of empirical patterns of 
commonality in observable social thought and behaviour, which are to be recognised in 
interaction. The weak sociality paradox – which was, as we saw, connected to a 
recognition-failure regarding the sociality that arises in times and locations different 
from one’s own – thus generates a problem for omniculture in practice. Even if 
omniculture existed we would not be able to recognise it as such, since we could not be 
guaranteed to recognise commonality regarding social qualities of mind. 
 
There is, however, a hint of an equivocation in Mogghadam’s formulation – on the one 
hand omniculture should, as noted, embrace qualities which people can recognise as 
shared across all social groups in everyday interactions; on the other hand, he also 
repeatedly stresses that these are qualities that have been established by ‘scientific 
research’ (e.g., p. 306, p. 319). This seems to locate the notion of an omnicultural 
universal at the level of what Chomsky (1965) called a ‘substantive’ universal – a directly 
observable commonality in the content of thought  or behaviour; in this way, it can be 
recognised in everyday interaction.  This contrasts with ‘formal’ universals, whose 
presence is not directly observed in the content of thought or behaviour, but which is 
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inferred or postulated as an underlying cause or origin of substantive universals or 
variations.  To sharpen this a little more: formal universals explain surface universals (and 
differences), whereas substantive universals describe them. In the ideas from evolutionary 
psychology outlined above, a generic ‘metatemplate’ for a natural kind would be a formal 
universal, and any common but specific qualities of representations of natural kinds 
would be substantive universals. More generally, the set of universals canvassed by 
Brown (1991, 2000) covers both kinds. 
 
5.3 Evolutionary Psychology and the Pan-Cultural 
 
This picture gives rise to a different possible origin for  generic qualities, drawing upon 
evolutionary constraints to ground the mandate. One – called ‘metaculture’ by Tooby & 
Cosmides (1992) – is connected to the evolutionary psychology view noted above. They 
suggest that, “All humans tend to impose on the world a common encompassing 
conceptual organization, made possible by universal mechanisms operating on the 
recurrent features of human life” (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: p. 91). Metaculture 
encompasses the generic and universal qualities of thought, activity and artefact that 
derive from the intersection of evolved modular dispositions with cross-culturally 
common social and ecological challenges. Although they are not ‘designed’ to create 
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culture, generic qualities of mind generate recurrent cultural patterns by responding to 
(relatively) non-contingent generic aspects of the environment. The generic qualities of 
culture then serve as foundation for cultural learning of specifics. Metaculture is thus 
grounded in the intersection of past culture and history and current ecological and social 
challenges with evolved dispositions.  Culture per se explains culture per se, but only 
via the intermediary of evolved mind. Evolutionary psychology has proposed mental 
modules specifically adapted to social functions (e.g., theory of mind, folk sociology). 
These psychological capacities are located in individuals, but ‘designed’ to process 
social inputs, so that the individual level is not individualistic – for biological reasons. 
They are constitutively social, but not constitutively socially constructed – the social 
qualities of mind are, rather, mandated by evolved adaptations. There is a sense in 
which causal social construction precedes cultural construction, in that the capacity to 
engage in joint actions and joint intentions depends on a prior capacity to conceive of 
others as separate, thinking social beings. Indeed, some have argued that culture is a 
spandrel or byproduct of adaptations that were designed for non-cultural reasons, but 
which respond to domains outside that original design (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004).  
The outcome is evolved capacities that by ‘design’ or accident support cultural 
construction of generic qualities, and these support causal social construction of specific 
details based on those generic qualities. 
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5.3 Evolutionary Learning Approaches and the Pan-Cultural 
 
A second evolutionarily inspired way of addressing cultural construction arises from more 
explicit attempts to connect cultural learning with biology. This emphasises the idea that 
evolved mental capacities are not modular, but are ‘designed’ as more flexible learning 
devices. One possibility is that major social and cognitive capacities evolved via 
something like ‘variability adaptation’, resulting in the capacity to respond to major 
environmental changes (as opposed to the adaptation to environmental constancies 
assumed by modularity; see Potts,1998; Franks, 2011, 2013a; Chiappe & Gardner, 2012). 
This arguably generated a suite of less special-purpose and more flexible heuristics for 
social learning (e.g., Boyd, Richerson & Henrich, 2012; Levinson, 2006). These depend 
on distinctly human capacities for co-operation (e.g., Tomasello, 1999, 2008), whose 
expression is interleaved, according to context and task, with a disposition towards 
competition. Such cultural learning is highly attuned to acquiring knowledge and skills 
from normatively-valued role models that have adaptive significance to a child’s 
community even where, for example, the results contrast with more easily available 
parental modelling (e.g., Hirschfeld, 2008).  A variety of such learning heuristics has been 
discussed, as has their connection with imitation and related co-operative capacities: all 
relate to the development of capacities that revolve around sociality. Such learning is 
cultural because it is biological – it arises because of the need to acquire complex 
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ecological and cultural adaptations (including ways of thinking, tools and artefacts) using 
relatively simple, evolved learning processes. These processes are attuned to cultural 
information in selecting role models and appropriate artefacts and tools. Such 
evolutionary drives also motivate successive changes and refinements to cultural artefacts 
and ideas, across generations.  
 
The overarching suggestion is that learning thereby occurs in an environment that is 
already ‘culturally engineered’ by previous generations (e.g., Cole, 1996; Sterelny, 2004), 
and the cultural accumulation of learning can generate biologically adaptive outcomes 
(Baldwin, 1896).  This possibility has been discussed in terms of ‘Baldwinian’ effects in 
evolution: that cultural learning may be a constraint on adaptations, in which a trait 
becomes innate as a result of first being learned and disseminated throughout a 
population. How this might come about in a way that avoids Lamarckism has been a 
matter of some debate (e.g., Watkins, 1999;  Papineau, 2005). Perhaps the most widely 
mooted option is one that emerges from Baldwin’s own conception that the specific 
developmental socio-cultural environment or set of contexts into which a child is born are 
as ‘unavoidable’ as both the ecological environment and their genetic inheritance 
(Baldwin, 1897: Chapter II). Niche construction (e.g., Lalande, Odling-Smee & Feldman, 
2000) suggests that such a recurrent aspect of the environment may constructed by a 
population of agents, which thereby generates a set of problems to which genetic 
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adaptation might then be made over subsequent generations. What begins as social 
learning directed by the social environment culminates in genetic inheritance and a 
preparedness to learn about that and similar environments. 
 
The scope for flexibility on such an evolutionary learning account is greater than in 
massive modularity, since culture can not only modulate but also transform the innate 
starting point, in a manner that echoes Vygotsky  (Vygotsky, 1978; see Franks, 2013b), 
and was substantially prefigured by Baldwin (Baldwin, 1896; 1897: Chapter II; see also 
Valsiner & van der Veer, 2000: Chapter 4).  The innate starting point is viewed less as a 
‘ballistic’ cause of later outcomes, and more as part of an ongoing developmental process 
(Baldwin, 1906; Franks, 2013b).  Such an approach leads to an emphasis on the 
emergence of mental capacities in specific cultural and ecological niches. The extent to 
which it is able to offer explanatory generalisations beyond micro-level descriptions of 
those niches (a problem that has been argued to arise from Baldwinian approaches: 
Valsiner & van der Veer, op cit) depends both on accounts of how niches operate in social 
psychological terms, and the extent of structure in the evolved social psychological 
capacities proposed. It is the latter that concerns us here. Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, 
Behne & Moll (2005), suggest that cognitive capacities that result from such learning may 
thus be dialogical and co-operative for biological reasons, arising from evolved capacities 
for engaging in joint intentionality. Cultural construction precedes social construction, in 
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the sense that the capacity for joint intentionality precedes the capacity for thinking about 
others as separate psycho-social beings, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically (Moll 
& Tomasello, 2007). Thinking that involves such joint intentions involves content and 
processes that are dialogical, which bear the stamp of the biological adaptation throughout 
their development and use. The social foundation for learning is thus a constitutive aspect 
of the use of the resulting capacity, which suggests an extended or situated cognition 
(Franks, 2011). Here, the capacity for culture is part of humans’ biological endowment 
(e.g., Henrich, 2008). That is, the evolutionary learning approach proposes that the 
innately mandated generic capacity to be cultural supports constitutive sociality; but that 
generic capacity is only ever expressed in the form of specific qualities of sociality that 
depend on specific historical and local circumstances for their expression.  Different 
accounts of how a specific culture would be constructed by the convergence of the innate 
sociality faculty and the specific socio-cultural context are offered by  the authors above.   
This underpins specific forms of thought which are subject to constitutive social 
construction.   
 
Notice that the broad concept of metaculture is equally consistent with the modular and 
the evolutionary learning views, even though it first emerged from the former. 
Metaculture expresses commonalities of culture that arise from the intersection of innate 
dispositions (whether the very specific ones proposed by modularity, or the more generic 
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ones proposed by evolutionary learning) with recurrent environmental challenges. The 
nature of the predicted qualities of metaculture might differ, but the general view is 
similar. 
 
We have thus suggested two evolutionarily-inspired ways in which the mind could be 
understood to be intrinsically social. One concerns a modular mental capacity comprising 
or being directly derived from an adaptation that is biologically ‘designed’ for social 
thinking or action. A second concerns the ongoing social environment and social 
interaction in particular constituting aspects of the mental processes and representations as  
connected to learning.  
 
The modular view suggests that the social is intrinsic to mind on the first reading, as a 
result of hypothesised adaptations for social thinking and acting. However, other aspects 
of the mind, whose specific adaptive purposes are not concerned with social thought and 
action, are therefore not intrinsically social.  The view also construes the interface 
between mind and context in a way that reflects the causal social construction, and so 
thereby (problematically) rules out the second form of intrinsic sociality based on 
constitutive social construction.  
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By contrast, evolved learning approaches offer scope for mind to be intrinsically social in 
both ways. First, the hypothesised learning capacities are intrinsically attuned to social 
relations, being ‘designed’ to seek out and learn from culturally appropriate role models. 
Second, the ongoing functioning of many of the mental capacities acquired in this way  
involve dialogical relations between a person and their social and cultural environment, so 
that thought reaches out to,  constitutively extends into that environment: it is 
constitutively socially constructed. 
 
So these evolutionary accounts not only offer ways of solving the sociality paradox, but 
do so in ways that require the integration of social construction and cultural 
construction. They offer different evolutionary proposals for such integration. The form 
of social construction they endorse, and the nature of intrinsic sociality, varies between 
those evolutionary accounts. Both take the social as intrinsic to mind, in no way 
superficial or optional to its workings; but they also offer ways in which this intrinsic 
sociality must nevertheless be context-dependent.  
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The contrasts with traditional social constructionism’s account of universals also now 
become clearer. Traditional social constructionism – including omniculture - is 
concerned with specific details of mental content and process, often interwoven; any 
universals arise adventitiously. Evolutionary approaches gloss universals somewhat 
differently: they concern generic contents and processes, as opposed to specific ones; 
they are non-contingent (except insofar as evolved adaptations are contingent), as 
opposed to amalgamations of the locally contingent; and they concern not just 
amalgamations of contents and processes, but also the culture-dependent learning 
devices that construct generic and specific contents and processes. They express not 
merely commonality of thoughts across cultures, but also commonality of processes for 
acquiring and developing new and specific thoughts. They have a different role in mind 
and social relations from the universals suggested by, for example, omniculture. Put 
differently, they are not merely descriptive or substantive universals, they are more 
clearly explanatory  or formal universals that give rise to or generate surface qualities. 
 
5.4 Evolutionary Developmental Systems Theory and the Pan-Cultural 
 
There is, however, a more radical view of the intersection of evolved and cultural 
influences on mind, which seems to result in a constitutively social constructionist picture 
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but where there is no role for cultural construction. This kind of view arises from ideas in 
developmental systems theory (e.g., Oyama, Griffiths & Gray, 2001), which add in further 
dynamics to the  Baldwinian or Vygotskyan picture offered by evolutionary learning 
theory, and lead to a view of mind as even more dependent on the specifics of the local 
situation than that proposed by evolutionary learning theory (e.g., Griffiths, 2003; see 
also, Laland, Sterelny, Odling-Smee, Hoppitt & Uller, 2011; Valsiner & van der Veer, 
2000: Chapter 4). Such a view  has many facets, but crucial for our purposes is the idea 
that inheritance is not simply  a matter of a relatively fixed genetic material combining 
with a relatively static environmental input, with the result being a more or less direct 
phenotypic expression of genotype. Rather, the dynamic process involves shifting 
environmental processes and multiple levels of inheritance.  This view would likely deny 
the possibility of genetic bases that directly lead to specific mental content and process 
(including specific qualities of sociality, as in modularity) or to more flexible mental 
content and processes (including generic sociality, as in evolved learning). It would, 
rather, suggest a dynamic, incremental developmental process of interaction between 
specific learning environments and open-ended learning dispositions. This picture would 
not only contradict the ‘biological’ side of the evolutionary views sketched above. It 
would also likely contradict the ‘environmental’ side of the modularity views. In 
particular, the idea of mental adaptations as arising as solutions to recurrent features of the 
environment is challenged by the idea of organisms (including humans) actively changing 
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their environments to which they then adapt.  And if there are no constant or generic 
aspects to the environment, this then challenges the possibility of metaculture as a 
foundation for cultural commonality and cultural construction. For example, Ingold’s 
concept of a ‘taskscape’ (Ingold, 1993, 2011) would suggest a dynamic, processual view 
of the interrelations of a person and the environment in which the specific and shifting 
properties of both are essential to explain the situated actions that arise. Such a view is in 
clear opposition to the modularity accounts noted above. Whilst its emphasis on a 
dynamic environment, situatedness and flexible learning bear similarity with the evolved 
learning approaches, it would nonetheless likely deny the possibility of innate dispositions 
to generic sociality or to being cultural.   
 
As a consequence, this more radical vision would seem to deny the distinction between 
social and cultural construction, in part because it denies the very possibility of cultural 
construction.  To debate this position would take us beyond the scope of this paper, but it 
seems likely that it would return us to the paradox of sociality, which itself arose from the 
very kinds of specificity and contingency that this position endorses.  
 
The broad conclusion is therefore that evolution per se does not circumvent the sociality 
paradox. Some circumvent it, and some reinforce it. Precisely which evolutionary 
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approach is the most plausible, remains empirically clear. Of course, if the more radical 
evolutionary view turned out to be the correct one, then this itself would suggest that the 
sociality paradox is here to stay. 
 
6  Social and Cultural Construction and the Challenge of  Intergroup Conflict 
 
The issues thus far are theoretical in nature. But they also contribute to the debate 
regarding intercultural contact and conflict. As noted, Mogghadam proposes 
omniculture as the starting point of intergroup contact, appealing to what is common to 
all humans and so raising the prospect of reducing conflict. Bilewicz & Bilewicz (2012) 
and Gillespie, Howarth & Cornish (2012) rightly indicate, however, that deciding what 
is common across humanity – ‘human nature’ – is complicated by political and 
theoretical questions. It may be that some of these complications arise from those 
authors’ focussing on specific, socially constructed qualities as opposed to generic, 
culturally constructed ones.  Taking cultural construction and the resultant metaculture 
as more central may allow us to reframe some of those issues.  
 
6.1 Essentialism, Intergroup Relations and Forms of Construction 
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For example, Gillespie, Howarth & Cornish (2012) argue that omniculture presupposes 
the categorical distinctions between people that it seeks to combat, and that those 
categories are not fixed, but depend on perspective and history, such that the social 
activities connected to those categories are constitutive of them. This is grist to my mill, 
fully consistent at least with the evolutionary learning view above. They go on to 
suggest that policy should emphasise the contingency of social categories and advocate 
a critical analysis of essentialised and naturalised social categories. This is also 
congenial, but it is also a point at which the distinction between social construction and 
cultural construction bites. To see this, note the quote from James with which their 
paper opens and closes begins as follows:  “What shall we call a thing anyhow? It 
seems quite arbitrary, for we carve out everything, just as we carve out constellations, to 
suit our human purposes” (James, 1907: p. 106). This suggests the contingency and 
specificity – more, the arbitrariness – of social categorisations, which seems to follow 
straightforwardly only if one takes the ‘human purposes’ to comprise socially 
constructed purposes alone. However,  if  such purposes and the resultant 
categorisations are in part guided or constrained by evolutionary dispositions, along the 
lines of cultural construction and evolutionary learning theory, a quite different picture 
emerges.  
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One recurrent finding regarding social categorisation is that commonsense thinking 
tends to demarcate groups according to their supposed possession of essential properties 
(e.g., Haslam, 1998, 2011; Hirschfeld, 1997; Mahalingam, 2003; McIntosh, 1998; 
Prenctice & Miller, 1999). To take this commonsense essentialism as only a social 
construction suggests that it could be eradicated under appropriate contingencies – 
essentialism would merely depend on perspective. But to take it, instead, to be part of 
culturally constructed metaculture – arising from qualities that are intrinsic to 
categorical thinking - may suggest that essentialisation per se is rather more resistant to 
change.  What might be challenged is the perspectival nature of specifically which 
categories are essentialised, and specifically which properties are understood to be 
essences. If anything, this increases the motivation for critical vigilance, since 
successfully challenging the claim that one set of properties comprises a category’s 
essence in no way prevents a different set of properties subsequently being recruited to 
fill that category’s essence ‘place holder’. Essentialism would simply return under 
another guise to re-essentialise thought about that category, especially given the 
presence of essentialising rhetoric in much public and private debate. Perhaps it is a 
further paradox  for social construction that the social change that it inspires may be as 
specific and contingent  - and therefore limited and temporary - in its effect as the 
processes of social construction themselves. 
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Holz & Wagner (2012) discuss the related possibility that violent derogation of 
outgroups may depend on the ‘naturalisation by essentialisation’ of group identities. 
Why do those who perpretate acts of inhumanity to others – war crimes, genocide, and 
other forms of individual and collective violence - appear to feel little compunction in 
doing so, and little pity towards their victims? Drawing a line between themselves and 
the victims according to the supposed possession and non-possession of essences is one 
foundation for not perceiving the victims as human beings. Once this step has been 
taken, then the moral obligations owed to another human being no longer apply. Holz & 
Wagner suggest that the near-impossibility of successfully countering essentialism per 
se should give rise to a different strategy. Rather than challenging essentialism per se, 
they suggest that greater common attention should be paid to providing “insight into 
language use and the often illegitimate inferences drawn from labels and names” (2012: 
p. 7).  That is, on the terms discussed here, a focus less on observed substantive 
universals and more on underlying formal universals that connect to them  - on the 
linguistic and cognitive practices that draw on and support the cultural construction of  
essentialisation (see also, Wagner, Holz & Kashima, 2009). 
 
6.2 Cultural Construction and Omniculture 
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Omniculture’s approach of aggregating over and finding similarities amongst specific 
beliefs, is only one way of seeking the pan-cultural, and depends on prioritising social 
construction over cultural construction. Cultural construction shifts the focus to generic 
psychological capacities that give rise to everyday social interaction, thereby producing 
specific beliefs. Glossing cultural construction in terms of the evolutionary learning 
approach, and not massive modularity, also has particular implications for intercultural 
engagement. 
 
One implication is stressing the potentially co-operative nature of central aspects of 
human social thought:  a common disposition towards co-operating and engaging in 
joint actions and projects, regardless of surface differences.  This disposition to co-
operation is intertwined with one to competition, and the relative preponderance of each 
is sensitive to real resource and power relations between individuals and groups. 
Another is stressing the idea that specific beliefs and surface differences are intrinsically 
bound up with our social life, so that differences may not be elided by mere contact 
alone, but by more structured engagement related to mutually understanding the 
different social and cultural conditions under which those surface differences arose, and 
understanding the linguistic and cognitive capacities that interpret those conditions in 
such a way as to maintain intergroup conflict.  These suggestions are in the spirit of 
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omniculture, since Mogghadam rightly focuses on empirically demonstrated 
similarities.  
 
However, cultural construction calls attention not only to specific ‘surface’ contents of 
mind and their similarities (minds as repositories of contents), but also to generic, 
culture-sensitive representations and the processes through which minds acquire those 
specific contents. Structured intercultural engagement, then, would not only involve 
articulating surface similarities, but also framing them in appropriately nuanced social 
psychological explanatory terms. It may be that social change inspired by attention to 
cultural construction, in paying attention to underlying, generic and recurrent qualities 
of mind,  would be more enduring than that inspired by social construction. 
 
A final caveat, however. For analytic purposes, I have drawn relatively sharp 
distinctions between cultural construction and social construction, universals and local 
qualities of mind, non-contingent and contingent, and generic and specific qualities of 
mind; each of these may be better considered as dimensional rather than categorical. All 
these distinction are merely theoretical lenses, and they have been given only a first 
framing here; there is no assumption that empirical social and psychological phenomena 
come neatly packaged along these lines. Rather, each phenomenon likely involves all 
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sides of the distinctions, to different degrees. And this means that practical applications 
will also draw on all sides, perhaps inadvertently.  
 
7  Conclusions 
Drawing a distinction between contingent social construction of specific qualities of mind 
and non-contingent cultural construction of generic qualities of mind, has led to a 
suggestion that the latter is able to resolve a paradox of sociality that seems to emerge 
from traditional social construction. But cultural construction itself requires explanation, 
and it was suggested that evolutionary accounts offer promising directions. One such – the 
evolutionary learning view – not only grounds cultural construction in evolved 
dispositions towards co-operation and cultural learning, but does so in conjunction with 
the ‘strongest’, constitutive variant of social construction. This outcome has implications 
for the roles of omniculture and other possible psychological universals, in supporting 
conflict reduction in inter-cultural contact. Framing contact not only in terms of the 
content of universals and differences, but also their differing mental roles, may be a 
further promising, empirically well-founded step in policy in this area. Over-all, the 
distinction between cultural construction and social construction, though only lightly 
sketched here, appears to have theoretical and practical resonance, which suggests that it 
is a promising line for future inquiry. 
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